Abstract
The "global war on terror" waged by the United States and its allies after the attacks of 11 September by definition transcends national borders. The very nature of the "enemy" in this so-called "war" implies that States are required to take action against international terrorist organizations not only within their territory, but also often outside their national borders, in areas subject to the territorial sovereignty of other States. Whilst in the past most anti-terrorist actions had the character of internal law enforcement operations conducted by governments within their own territory, after 11 September most of the operations in the "war on terror" have been carried out outside the national borders of the States spearheading the campaign, often -but not always -with the consent and the cooperation of the State exercising sovereign authority over the area where the operations are taking place. 1 Owing to the extraterritorial character of these operations, in many cases persons captured have been detained by armed forces or non-military law enforcement agencies operating outside their national territory.
"Detention abroad" may be very broadly defined as any deprivation of liberty of an individual against his or her will 2 by agents acting outside the sovereign territory of the State on behalf of which they act. For the purposes of this paper, it is also to be understood to cover the exceptional situation where an individual is held by a third State at the request of, and under the effective control of, the agents of another State.
Detention abroad is by no means a new phenomenon; international humanitarian law expressly envisages that States will detain individuals outside their own national territory, especially in the course of international armed conflict and belligerent occupation, and in some circumstances requires them to do so. Furthermore, in transnational law enforcement operations it will often happen that persons find themselves in the custody of agents of a State other than the territorial State, for instance during transfer from the custody of one State to another in cases of extradition/rendition.
However, the phenomenon is of particular interest in the context of the "war on terror", for not only have an unprecedented number of persons been detained outside the national territory of the State holding them, but such detentions have also and above all sparked legal controversy as to which -and indeed, whether -international legal standards providing for the protection of 1 E.g. the strike by an unmanned aircraft in Yemen which killed six suspected terrorists: J. Risen and J. Miller, "U.S. is reported to kill al Qaeda leader in Yemen", New York Times, 5 November 2002. It seems that Yemen had given its prior consent to this action and was cooperating with it, although reports were nuanced: see e.g. W. Pincus, "Missile strike carried out with Yemeni cooperation", Washington Post, 6 November 2002. 2 In this respect, the definition is by no means limited to the detention of convicted criminals or of suspects pending trial, but is wide enough to cover any form of deprivation of liberty, including the detention of prisoners of war during an armed conflict, internment during a belligerent occupation, and administrative detention (for instance of illegal immigrants pending expulsion), as well as other forms of de facto detention which may not be easily fitted into any of these traditional categories. It is also sufficiently wide to cover the situation of arrest and detention outside national territory by agents of the State, whether or not with the consent and cooperation of the territorial State.
individuals in detention are applicable. Since 9/11, certain States have adopted a policy of detaining individuals abroad, while at the same time denying the applicability of the legal guarantees which, under both domestic and international law, are generally accepted as protecting persons deprived of their liberty.
Regardless of whether and to what extent these arguments may be sound as a matter of domestic law, it is indisputable that, as a matter of international law, they are inherently flawed. The position that, by keeping individuals detained during the "war on terror" outside the national territory of the State, State authorities can bypass some or all of the guarantees and limits on State action enshrined in international humanitarian law (IHL) 3 and/or in international human rights law 4 is not justified. The practical importance of determining with precision which rules apply to the treatment of individuals deprived of their liberty during the "war on terror" has been repeatedly stressed during the last three years, most prominently by the International Committee of the Red Cross. In September 2004, the ICRC recalled that, from its "decades of experience in visiting places of detention in vastly different, rapidly changing environments", it was clear that "only by determining and adhering to a clearly established legal framework does one prevent arbitrariness and abuse." 5 The overall purpose of the present paper is to attempt to clarify which rules of international law are applicable to persons held in detention abroad in the "war on terror", and in particular to show that, despite the arguments put forward by some States, they are not in some "legal black hole" 6 without any international legal protection. It starts by reviewing the phenomenon of extraterritorial detentions in the context of the "war on terror". In the main section of the article the applicability of the rules of IHL and international human rights law to persons detained abroad during the "war on terror" is then discussed, juxtaposing the positions adopted in that regard by the States principally involved in extraterritorial detentions. A short analysis of the nature of the "war on terror" is followed by sub-sections examining the applicability of IHL to those captured during the armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the question of the continued applicability of human rights law in situations of armed conflict, the principles relating to the extraterritorial application of human rights law, and the principle of non-refoulement. In the final section a brief survey is made of recent developments, which appear to show an incipient reassertion of the traditional understanding that the protections of IHL and/or international human rights law apply to all persons detained by the State, wherever they are held. The focus is on the applicability of the two potentially relevant branches of law; there is consequently no detailed analysis of the content of the substantive protections of international human rights law and IHL, although reference is necessarily made to those rules in passing.
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The phenomenon of extraterritorial detentions in the "war on terror"
As a result of US military and security operations since the beginning of hostilities in Afghanistan and Iraq, a cumulative total of 50,000 individuals have been in the custody of US forces. 8 Thousands of people were taken prisoner by Coalition forces during the conflict in Afghanistan. They were initially detained in the custody of Coalition forces in Afghanistan or on US navy vessels in the region. Since then, the large majority of them have been handed over to the new Afghani authorities. However, some are still held in detention facilities run by Coalition forces and located within Afghanistan and Pakistan. 9 In addition, since early 2002 the United States has transferred hundreds of individuals suspected to be members of al Qaeda or the Taliban to the American base at Guantánamo Bay. As indicated by senior officials of the US Department of Defense, detainees were transferred to Guantánamo because they were either deemed to have "significant intelligence value", or were thought to 7 For a more detailed examination of substantive guarantees, see S. Borelli, "The treatment of terrorist suspects captured abroad: Human rights and humanitarian law" in A. Quite apart from concerns about the treatment and the conditions of detention of individuals detained abroad by the US military or law enforcement agencies of the United States, more serious misgivings stem from the persistent reports of transferrals of individuals characterized as terrorist suspects in the custody of the United States who are "unresponsive to interrogations" to foreign countries for further questioning. While in some cases the individual transferred was originally found on the territory of the United States, 17 a number of terrorist suspects captured by US agents operating on the territory of a third State have been transferred directly to other countries, through rendition procedures that fall short of the minimum standards set forth by applicable international extradition procedures. 18 Several of the countries receiving the suspects handed over have a particularly negative human rights record and, in particular, a history of using torture and other unlawful methods of interrogation.
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Moreover, there appear to have been a number of irregular renditions by States to US officials outside the United States, who have then transferred the person or persons concerned to third States. 20 Finally, the most disturbing cases involve individuals who have "disappeared" after being captured by or handed over to US forces and whose whereabouts are totally unknown.
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With regard to the US, it seems clear that the choice of detaining individuals abroad as part of the "war on terror" is based, at least in part, on the assumption that by keeping them outside national territory, the military or the other agencies will not be restricted by standards of national (and international) legal protection in the same way as if they were held on national territory. This much is evident from a number of internal memoranda providing legal advice would be prohibited under US law. The US government negotiated "status of forces" agreements with several foreign governments allowing the US to set up CIA-run interrogation facilities and granting immunity to US personnel and private contractors; see J. Barry to the Bush administration, which has consistently attempted to argue either that the United States is not bound by certain obligations, or that certain international obligations are simply not applicable to the new paradigm of the "war on terror", or that the obligations in question are not applicable to agents of the United States when acting abroad.
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The international legal framework Preliminary considerations: The multifaceted nature of the "war on terror"
Any attempt to clarify the rules applicable to persons detained during the "war on terror" must start by recognizing the multifaceted nature of that "war." 23 However appealing it is to the mass media or as a rhetorical device used for the purposes of political discourse, the concept of a "war on terror" -i.e. an armed conflict 24 waged against a loosely organized transnational terrorist network -does not stand up when analysed from the viewpoint of international law. The renewed efforts against international terrorism which started after 9/11 cannot be characterized as a whole as an armed conflict within the meaning that contemporary international law gives to that concept: the transnational nature of the operations carried out in the context of the global "war on terror", coupled with the fact that an international coalition is currently involved in those operations, directly excludes the possibility of qualifying that "war" as an internal armed conflict. Nor can it be characterized as an international armed conflict, since it is generally accepted that international law does not recognize the possibility of an international armed conflict arising between It is nonetheless indisputable that within the wider context of the "war on terror", two international armed conflicts stricto sensu have taken place, namely the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.
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To the minds of those who invoke that notion, however, the "war on terror" extends far beyond the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq to encompass all the anti-terror operations which have taken place since September 2001. Whilst a large proportion of those operations have been carried out within the territory of the States involved and by agents of those States, several have had a transnational character and have seen the involvement of law enforcement agencies and military forces of numerous States. From the perspective of international law, the latter operations are not part of any "war" or of any armed conflict, and are to be considered as law enforcement operations on an international scale against a transnational criminal organization.
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A necessary distinction has therefore to be drawn between captures and detentions which took place in the context of an armed conflict stricto sensu, i.e. during the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq and the subsequent military occupation, and arrests and detention carried out in the context of law enforcement operations.
Despite different views expressed by some of the protagonists, the rules of IHL regulating international armed conflict (and military occupation) were applicable in full to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. 28 Moreover, as will be discussed in more detail below, certain rules of international human rights law were and remain applicable to individuals held in that context.
Finally, as regards the law enforcement operations outside the two armed conflicts, although IHL does not apply to such operations, 29 the international law of human rights is fully applicable. Note also that prisoners of war must be released "without delay" upon the close of active hostilities (GC III, Art. 118(1)) unless they have been indicted for criminal offences (Art. 119(5)). Similarly, protected persons under GC IV who have been interned during the conflict should be released as soon as possible after the close of hostilities (Art. 133); however, those who continue to be detained after the end of the armed conflict retain the protections of GC IV until their release (GC IV, Art. 6(4)). 29 Although the protections of individuals under IHL are inapplicable, certain rights given to States (e.g. to detain without charge or intern until the end of hostilities) also are not applicable. 30 Subject to the possibility of derogation in accordance with the terms of the instrument in question. See below, "Applicability of international human rights law during armed conflict or states of emergency".
Detention in the context of armed conflict/military occupation: applicability of the protections of international humanitarian law
Although at the start of the two armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, all States involved were party to the Geneva Conventions, 31 the main Coalition States have adopted very different positions as to the applicability of the protections contained therein. While the United Kingdom did not dispute the overall applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, 32 the US has taken a much more controversial stance, in particular with respect to the conflict in Afghanistan, based on the peculiar assumption that the military operations in Afghanistan were carried out in two different "wars".
The applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the first "war", the one between the Coalition forces and the Taliban, was not disputed. 33 However, the US approach with regard to the status of persons apprehended during the said conflict has not been consistent with that position, and has in effect divested the formal recognition of the Conventions' applicability of any practical significance: on 7 February 2002 the US declared that, although in principle the Geneva Conventions applied to members of the Taliban, Taliban soldiers taken prisoner in Afghanistan could not be considered prisoners of war under the Third Geneva Convention, as they were "unlawful combatants" in that they did not satisfy the requirements of Article 4 thereof.
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With respect to the other "war" fought on Afghan territory, that against al Qaeda, the administration's position was that "none of the provisions of Geneva [sic] expressed the view that whilst Iraqi citizens in the hands of Coalition forces are to be considered POWs, some non-Iraqi prisoners captured by American forces in Iraq are not entitled to the protections of the Geneva Conventions and can therefore be removed from the occupied territory and transferred abroad for interrogation, and further that detained Iraqi citizens could be removed from Iraq for "a brief but not indefinite period, to facilitate interrogation". The conclusions of that draft were adopted by the administration. 41 No specific statements appear to have been made with regard to persons captured abroad outside the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, as a result of US or foreign law enforcement operations. It is to be inferred, however, that the US position is the same as that adopted towards members of al Qaeda captured in Afghanistan and that, although they are alleged to have been captured in the context of a "war", the protections of the Geneva Conventions are not applicable to them.
The position of the US is in conflict with the generally accepted principles relative to the application of IHL. The official commentary to the Geneva Conventions posits that there is a "general principle which is embodied in all four Geneva Conventions of 1949", namely that during an armed conflict or a military occupation:
"Every person in enemy hands must have some status under international law: he is either a prisoner of war and, as such, covered by the Third The position adopted was that "it was automatic that Geneva would apply" to the conflict, since it was a "traditional war", "a conflict between two states that are parties to the Geneva Conventions" (ibid. As long as this interpretation is accepted, the answer to the question "which rules apply to individuals captured during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan?" is relatively straightforward: every person taken prisoner during those conflicts and the occupation of Iraq is entitled to some degree of protection under the Geneva system, albeit the protection afforded differs in extent depending on whether the person concerned is a prisoner of war or a civilian.
In particular, as regards individuals belonging to the regular armed forces of the adverse party, the general principle is that any member of the armed forces of a party to a conflict is a combatant, and any combatant captured by the adverse party is a prisoner of war. Article 4A(1) of the Third Geneva Convention provides that captured "members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces", are prisoners of war, while under Article 4A(2) "members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps" who have fallen into the hands of the enemy are POWs if they (a) are commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, (b) have a fixed distinctive sign, (c) carry arms openly, and (d) conduct their operations in accordance with the laws of war. Art. 4A(3) further specifies that members of the armed forces of the adverse party have to be considered prisoners of war, regardless of whether the party to which they profess allegiance has been recognized by the detaining power into whose hands they have fallen.
It is important to note that, as is clear from the structure and internal logic of the provision, the above-mentioned conditions in Article 4A(2) apply only to persons belonging to "other militias" and "voluntary groups" and not to those belonging to other categories of protected persons under Article 4A. Accordingly, only members of "other militias" under Article 4A(2) can be lawfully denied the status of prisoners of war if they do not fulfil one of the said conditions. 43 The members of the Taliban army captured during the war in Afghanistan indisputably belonged to the category outlined in Article 4A(3), in that they were "[m]embers of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognised by the Detaining Power". The position of the US seems, on the contrary, to be based on the assumption that combatants under Article 4A(3) of the Third Geneva Convention must fulfil the conditions set forth in Article 4A(2) in order to enjoy POW status. 44 Even conceding, (2) apply to other categories of combatants, it is clear from the text of Article 4 that in any case, in order to deprive a prisoner of his POW status, it is necessary to prove that the individual personally has failed to respect the laws of war. The general determination that no Taliban prisoner is entitled to POW status because of the Taliban's "alliance" with a terrorist organization is thus based on a misinterpretation of Article 4.
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As for members of al Qaeda captured in Afghanistan, they were not "members of the armed forces" of one of the belligerents. They could arguably fall into the second category outlined in Article 4A, in that they constituted a "voluntary militia", but as such they, unlike the Taliban, would have had to fulfil the conditions set out in Article 4A(2) in order to be considered prisoners of war.
Whatever the questions of categorization, no individual status determinations have been made by any "competent tribunal."
46 Under Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention, if "any doubt arise[s]" as to whether enemy combatants meet the criteria for POW status, the detaining power must grant detainees "the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal." Moreover, Article 5 requires not only that the status of a combatant who falls into the hands of the enemy be determined by a competent tribunal, but also that it be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Generalized determinations relating to the status of a group of detainees or of a whole category of enemy combatants therefore do not comply with the requirement of Article 5, in particular when such a determination is made by the executive.
Therefore, al Qaeda members captured in the theatre of military operations while fighting alongside the armed forces of a belligerent in the conflict should have been considered POWs until their status had been determined by a competent tribunal. 47 But even if a determination were made that a particular individual is not entitled to POW status, he or she would still enjoy some degree of protection under the Geneva system. In particular, captured enemy combatants who do not qualify for POW status would generally still qualify as "protected persons" under the Fourth Geneva Convention. 48 The category of "protected persons" under that Convention includes not only persons not taking part in the hostilities, but also the so-called "unprivileged belligerents," 49 i.e. individuals engaging in belligerent acts but who are determined by a competent tribunal not to be entitled to POW status under Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention. The main consequence of the denial of POW status is that such individuals do not enjoy "combatant privilege" and may therefore be prosecuted for the mere fact of having engaged in combat. 50 On the other hand, nationals of the adverse party who are not entitled to POW status and who are therefore "protected persons" under the Fourth Geneva Convention enjoy certain protections not afforded to POWs, including in particular the absolute prohibition of deportation from occupied territory. traced back to the assumption that those persons would be protected more efficiently by their national State through diplomatic protection. Although in the current political context such an assumption may not be particularly sound, the United Kingdom at least has been partially successful in securing the release of some of its citizens who were detained at Guantánamo Bay, while other governments have obtained the release of their nationals on condition that they prosecute them upon their return, or have obtained guarantees that the death penalty will not be sought for their citizens if put on trial.
Quite apart from the potential protection afforded by diplomatic protection, even those who are not protected persons under the Fourth Geneva Convention because of their nationality would in any case be protected by the "minimum yardstick" 54 of fair and humane treatment contained in Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, and would also be entitled to the protections contained in Article 75 of Protocol I. 55 
Protection of detainees under international human rights law
Some prisoners in the "war on terror", however, fall outside the protection of the Geneva system. The first and most numerous category is that of persons captured in the context of law enforcement operations carried out by the US and its allies throughout the world after 11 September 2001. As already discussed, those operations cannot be characterized as being part of an "armed conflict" within the meaning that international law attributes to that term. In this respect, the US assertion that "none of the provisions of Geneva [sic] apply to our conflict with al Qaeda," 56 whilst being undeniably correct, is irrelevant: the Geneva Conventions do not apply for the very simple reason that the "war on terror" is not an armed conflict.
But quite apart from the question of the applicability of the rules of IHL, the fundamental rights of every individual detained in the context of the "war on terror", including those detained as a result of law enforcement operations outside the context of an armed conflict, are protected by international human rights law.
In relation to international human rights law, the United States has in the past consistently denied the extraterritorial application of human rights obligations. 57 It has also denied that human rights apply in time of armed conflict, 58 and has recently reiterated both of these positions with regard to the detainees at Guantánamo Bay.
54 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
Merits, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 114, para. 218. 55 P I, Art. 75, applies to any person finding themselves in the power of a party to the conflict, insofar as they do not benefit from more favourable treatment under the Conventions or under the Protocol itself. Although the US is not a party to Protocol I, it has declared that it will consider itself bound by those rules contained in it which reflect customary international law, and has long recognized the customary nature of its Art. The UK government has taken the more nuanced position that the European Convention on Human Rights is not applicable to the actions of UK troops overseas. In particular, it denied the applicability of the Convention with regard to Iraq on the ground that that country is outside the territorial scope of the Convention, and that in any case British troops did not exercise the required degree of control.
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None of the arguments put forward as to the non-applicability of international human rights law is sufficient to justify the non-application of human rights norms to individuals detained abroad in the context of the "war on terror". In response to those arguments, the considerations affecting the extent to which international human rights law affords protection to individuals detained abroad will now be discussed.
The first question is that of the continued applicability of international human rights law during an armed conflict to individuals who are also protected by IHL. The second and more complex question concerns the extent to which a State is bound by its international human rights obligations when its agents perform acts outside its own territory, and therefore outside that State's normal sovereign jurisdiction (applicability ratione loci). Finally, the so-called principle of non-refoulement is also of clear relevance in relation to individuals held in detention in the "war on terror".
Applicability of international human rights law during armed conflict
Notwithstanding contrary views expressed by an increasingly limited number of States, 61 it is a well-established principle of contemporary international law that the applicability of international human rights law is not confined to times of peace, and that the existence of a state of armed conflict does not justify the suspension of fundamental human rights guarantees. This principle, affirmed by the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion in 1996, 62 has recently been restated by the Court in the following terms: "The protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation of the kind to be found in Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law, there are thus three possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international law." Similarly, in a case relating to the military operations conducted by US forces in Grenada, the Inter-American Commission, rejecting the US contention that "the matter was wholly and exclusively governed by the law of international armed conflict," 64 held that: "While international humanitarian law pertains primarily in times of war and the international law of human rights applies most fully in times of peace, the potential application of one does not necessarily exclude or displace the other. There is an integral linkage between the law of human rights and humanitarian law because they share a 'common nucleus of non-derogable rights and a common purpose of protecting human life and dignity' , and there may be a substantial overlap in the application of these bodies of law." 65 Although all human rights treaties of a general scope contain a provision that allows States to derogate from some of the guarantees contained in them to the extent strictly necessary to counter threats to the life of the State during times of national emergency or armed conflict, 66 there are a number of rights that can never be derogated from. The list of non-derogable rights varies from instrument to instrument. However, those such as the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life, the right to respect for physical integrity, and the right not to be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment are universally recognized as non-derogable rights that States are required to respect, and to ensure respect for, in all circumstances. 67 Besides the possibility of derogation in accordance with the terms of the instrument in question, 68 the exact content of the rights of individuals under international human rights law may differ during armed conflict owing to the simultaneous applicability of the lex specialis contained in the applicable rules of IHL. As observed by the ICJ in Nuclear Weapons, even the content of some nonderogable rights (in particular, the right to life) may be different in the context of an armed conflict. 69 However, this issue is of little relevance to the question of detention, as the right to life retains its full force for persons who are not active combatants, given the parallel prohibition in IHL of arbitrary deprivation of life of individuals not taking an active part in the hostilities. Similarly, the applicability of IHL does not result in it operating as a lex specialis in relation to the prohibition of torture, given the parallel absolute prohibition contained in it.
Finally, in addition to the substantive rights expressly declared to be non-derogable, a number of procedural rights which are instrumental to the effective protection of non-derogable rights, must also be respected in all circumstances. Among them is the right to have access to domestic courts for violations of non-derogable rights, and the right to habeas corpus. Some fundamental aspects of the right to fair trial are also generally considered as nonderogable. 70 Again IHL, where applicable, may have an impact on the content of the non-derogable procedural rights protected under international human rights law, insofar as it provides for different rules. For instance, whether or not the trial of a POW was fair will be determined by the standards laid down in IHL, rather than by those laid down in international human rights law.
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The extraterritorial applicability of international human rights law Most human rights treaties expressly require States Parties to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of the rights and freedoms contained therein.
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For the purpose of application of international human rights law, the notion of "jurisdiction" assumes a meaning wider in scope than that normally attributed to it under other branches of international law. 73 When asked to determine whether a given act carried out extraterritorially by agents of the State constitutes an exercise of "jurisdiction" for the purposes of application of human rights obligations, the human rights monitoring bodies have indicated that States are "bound to secure the (…) rights and freedoms of all persons under their actual authority and responsibility, whether that authority is exercised within their own territory or abroad," 74 and that "in principle, the inquiry turns not on the presumed victim's nationality or presence within a particular geographic area, but on whether, under the specific circumstances, the State observed the rights of a person subject to its authority and control."
75 Whilst acknowledging the primarily territorial nature of each State's jurisdictional competence, human rights bodies have found that in "exceptional" 76 or "special" 77 circumstances the acts of States party to a humanitarian treaty which are performed outside their territory or which produce effects there may amount to exercise by them of their "jurisdiction" within the meaning of the jurisdictional provisions.
An analysis of the relevant case-law of both universal and regional human rights bodies shows that the "exceptional circumstances" justifying the extraterritorial application of human rights obligations may be roughly grouped into the following broad categories.
a) Exercise by the State of its authority and control over an area situated outside its national territory
A State may be held responsible under human rights law for conduct which, though performed outside its national territory, occurs in an area over which it exercises its authority and control. There are a number of situations in which the level of that control exercised by a State may be sufficient to render its human rights obligations applicable extraterritorially, including those relating to the treatment of persons in detention A first such situation is undoubtedly that of military occupation. 78 In its Advisory Opinion on The Wall the ICJ observed that Israel, as the occupying power, had exercised its territorial jurisdiction over the occupied Palestinian 461, speaks in terms of whether the territory is "actually placed under the authority" of the occupying force, and "occupation" is expressly limited to those areas "where such authority has been established and can be exercised".
territories and was therefore required to respect its obligations under international human rights law with regard to every individual living within that area. 79 A similar approach has consistently been taken by the Human Rights Committee when called upon to comment on the applicability of the ICCPR to situations of military occupation. 80 Accordingly, the States which took part in the occupation of Iraq after the armed conflict were bound to respect their human rights obligations in relation to the areas under their control.
A second situation, in many ways similar to the one mentioned above, is where a State deploys its armed forces on foreign soil in response to an "invitation" by the territorial State or other entities exercising de facto control over the area in question. This would appear to be an appropriate characterization of the situation of the Coalition forces in both Afghanistan and Iraq after the restoration of power to the local authorities, with the result that their human rights obligations are fully applicable in relation to individuals detained by them in those States.
Whilst a level of control justifying the applicability of human rights obligations is inherent in the situation of military occupation, with the consequence that the State is held to exercise jurisdiction as if it were the territorial sovereign, in other situations of "military presence on foreign soil" the assessment of whether the State does in fact exercise "jurisdiction" has to be made on a case-by-case basis.
Within the European system, the Turkish military intervention in northern Cyprus in 1974 and the continuing presence of Turkish armed forces have given rise to a line of jurisprudence which is of obvious significance in determining whether a State party to the European Convention is to be deemed responsible for breaches occurring in military operations on foreign territory that fall short of occupation. The European Court has held that, for the purpose of determining whether in such circumstances the State is actually exercising its "jurisdiction", the characterization of the legality of military operations under the rules relating to the use of force and/or territorial integrity is completely irrelevant, since "[t]he obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights concern about the fact that "Israel continues to deny its responsibility to fully apply the Covenant in the occupied territories", UN Doc. A/53/40 (1998), para. 306. The Committee reiterated its position when commenting on the latest Israeli report as follows: "… in the current circumstances, the provisions of the Covenant apply to the benefit of the population of the Occupied Territories, for all conduct by the State party's authorities or agents in those territories that affects the enjoyment of rights enshrined in the Covenant and falls within the ambit of State responsibility of Israel under the principles of public international law"; UN Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR (2003), para. 11. Note also the comments made in 1991 when considering Iraq's third report, in which the Committee expressed its "particular concern" for the fact that the report did not address events in Kuwait after 2 August 1990, "given Iraq's clear responsibility under international law for the observance of human rights during its occupation of that country"; UN Doc. A/46/40 (1991), para. 652.
and freedoms set out in the Convention derives from the fact of such control, whether it be exercised directly, through its armed forces, or through a subordinate local administration."
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In addition, as regards the "degree" of control a State has to exercise over the area in question for its responsibility under the Convention to be engaged, the European Court has made clear that "it is not necessary to determine whether a Contracting Party actually exercises detailed control over the policies and actions of the authorities in the area situated outside its national territory, since even overall control of the area may engage the responsibility of the Contracting Party concerned."
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In the case of overall control over an extraterritorial area the responsibility of the State "is not confined to the acts of its soldiers or officials in that area but also extends to acts of the local administration which survives there by virtue of [its] military and other support." 83 Furthermore, it appears that responsibility in these situations extends not only to violations of the negative duties not to infringe rights that are protected, but also the procedural "positive" duties which the European Court has derived from the Convention.
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A third situation in which the "extraterritorial" responsibility of a State may be engaged is where it exercises effective and exclusive control of a -normally relatively small -area outside its territory with the valid consent of the territorial State. Situations falling within this hypothesis are, for instance, those in which two States conclude an international agreement by virtue of which one of the parties acquires the right to maintain a military or other base on a portion of the other's territory. These may range from the quasi-permanent UK "sovereign" bases in Cyprus and the US naval base at Guantánamo Bay to less permanent agreements relating to the stationing of troops abroad. This category is of particular relevance for the present analysis, given that since 11 September 2001 the United States has set up military bases housing around sixty thousand troops in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, in addition to the pre-existing bases in Kuwait, Qatar, Turkey and Bulgaria. Also of importance is the US naval base on the British territory of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.
All aspects of jurisdiction and authority over bases in host countries are generally spelled out in the agreements on the status of the base and what are normally referred to as "status of forces agreements". Although the question of jurisdiction over the somewhat unusual US base at Guantánamo Bay has been considered by the Inter-American Commission, 85 no cases of violations at the more normal types of bases have come before the international human rights monitoring bodies. However, it may be conjectured that the extent to which responsibility attaches for acts at the respective base, and to which State, largely depends upon the amount of jurisdiction retained by the host State. As regards Guantánamo Bay, for instance, although in theory Cuba still retains ultimate sovereignty over the territory, the US exercises "exclusive control and jurisdiction," 86 thus the performance of both positive and negative duties deriving from international human rights norms must necessarily be the responsibility of the US. 87 When the grants of jurisdiction to the visiting State are more limited, such as those where criminal jurisdiction over soldiers is reserved for the visiting State only for acts performed in an official capacity, the positive duties deriving from international instruments (e.g. the duty to carry out an effective investigation in connection with the right to life) 88 may remain at least to some extent incumbent upon the territorial State. But this will depend in every case on the particular violation complained of, and on the terms of the individual agreement with the host State. 89 As for the ECHR, a limit to the extraterritorial scope of application of the Convention due to the exercise of overall control may arise from the regional nature of that instrument. The decision of the European Court in Banković 90 appeared to introduce a limit to the wide interpretation previously given to the term "jurisdiction" under the ECHR. In response to an argument by the applicants that the European Convention should apply to NATO bombing operations in Serbia in order to prevent a "regrettable vacuum in the Convention system of human rights' protection," 91 the Court, having emphasized the "special character of the Convention as a constitutional instrument of European public order" and the "essentially regional vocation of the Convention system," 92 responded that:
"The Convention is a multilateral treaty operating (…) in an essentially regional context and notably in the legal space (espace juridique) of the Contracting States. (…) The Convention was not designed to be applied throughout the world, even in respect of the conduct of Contracting States." 93 The natural reading of this passage is that it imposes a general spatial limit on the applicability of the Convention; the position of the UK with regard to the non-applicability of the ECHR to the actions of its forces in Iraq, mentioned above, is clearly based on this reasoning.
However, in the most recent case concerning jurisdiction, the Court appears to have reduced almost to vanishing point the importance of the limitation apparently introduced in Banković. In Issa v. Turkey, 94 a case brought by the relatives of Kurds resident in northern Iraq who were allegedly killed by members of the Turkish armed forces on Iraqi territory, the Court did not dispose of the case on the basis that the victims were outside the espace juridique of the Convention, 95 and indeed the reasoning of the Court does not appear to envisage that the notion of espace juridique would have been an obstacle to the responsibility of Turkey if sufficient proof of Turkish involvement had been produced. The Court held that:
"The Court does not exclude the possibility that, as a consequence of this military action, the Respondent State could be considered to have exercised, temporarily, effective overall control of a particular portion of the territory of northern Iraq. Accordingly, if there is a sufficient factual basis for holding that, at the relevant time, the victims were within that specific area, it would follow logically that they were within the jurisdiction of Turkey (and not that of Iraq, which is not a Contracting State and clearly does not fall within the legal space (espace juridique) of the Contracting States." 96 What the Court appears to be saying here is that, once it is established that a State exercises "overall control" over an area outside its territory, that area automatically is under the jurisdiction of the said State and consequently falls within the espace juridique of the Convention, regardless of its actual geographical position or the fact that it remains the territory of another State which is not a party to the Convention.
b) Extraterritorial action of State agents in situations short of overall control
An alternative way in which the "extraterritorial" responsibility of a State can be engaged is where its agents perform ad hoc operations in the territory of another State and exercise control over the person of an individual, but without exercising sufficient control over an area for the human rights obligations to be 93 Ibid., para. 80. 94 Issa Merits, op. cit. (note 76). 95 Rather, the Court decided the case on the basis that at the relevant time, Turkey did not exercise "effective overall control" of the entire area of northern Iraq (ibid., para. 75), and it was not satisfied to the required standard of proof that Turkish troops had conducted operations in the area in question (ibid., para. 81). 96 Ibid., para. 74. applicable in accordance with the principles set out in the previous section. This is of obvious relevance as a fall-back argument for invoking the applicability of human rights norms to all situations where individuals are detained abroad in the custody of agents of a State, whatever the scale of that State's operations in the foreign territory. 97 Under the ICCPR, the responsibility of a State for violations of protected rights committed by its agents in the territory of another State, whether or not this other State acquiesced in those actions, has been recognized by the Human Rights Committee, which has observed that:
"Article 2(1) of the Covenant places an obligation upon a State Party to respect and to ensure rights 'to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction' , but it does not imply that the State Party concerned cannot be held accountable for violations of rights under the Covenant which its agents commit upon the territory of another State, whether with the acquiescence of the Government of that State or in opposition to it. (…) it would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a State Party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of another State, which violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory." 98 This principle has also been recognized, in a particularly wide formulation, by the European Commission of Human Rights:
"Authorised agents of a State not only remain under its jurisdiction when abroad, but bring any other person 'within the jurisdiction' of that State to the extent that they exercise authority over such persons. Insofar as the State's acts or omissions affect such persons, the responsibility of the State is engaged."
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It should be noted that, in this situation, the reason for application of the State's international human rights obligations is a recognition of the fact that during the operations in question its agents exercise a certain de facto control over the person of individuals, and that it is on this basis that the State's responsibility for infringements of individual rights by those agents is engaged. 100 However, unlike the situations described above, the fact that in these cases the control is exercised in a more or less limited, incidental and ad hoc manner . In relation to its jurisdiction to hear the complaints under the Optional Protocol, which also speaks of "individuals subject to its jurisdiction", the Committee held that "The reference in article 1 of the Optional Protocol to 'individuals subject to its jurisdiction' (…) is not to the place where the violation occurred, but rather to the relationship between the individual and the State in relation to a violation of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant, wherever they occurred"; see implies that the State is not required to fulfil the whole range of obligations under human rights law, but arguably only to respect its negative obligation not to infringe the rights of the individuals involved.
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The principle of non-refoulement
Quite apart from the situations mentioned in the previous section, where applicability of human rights law is premised on the fact that the State exercises a sufficient degree of control either over an area as a whole or over particular individuals, there is a further scenario in which a State may be considered responsible for a breach of its obligations under international human rights law, even when the actual violation of an individual's fundamental rights takes place outside its national territory and under the jurisdiction of a third State. In the words of the European Court of Human Rights, "[a] State's responsibility may also be engaged on account of acts which have sufficiently proximate repercussions on rights guaranteed by the Convention, even if those repercussions occur outside its jurisdiction. " 102 The main corollary of this principle is that a State will violate its international obligations if it hands over a person to another State where there are reasonable grounds to believe that there is, in the formulation of the European Court, a "well-founded fear" or a "real risk" that he or she will suffer a violation of his or her fundamental rights in the receiving State. 103 In this regard, the Human Rights Committee has stated that:
"If a State Party takes a decision relating to a person within its jurisdiction, and the necessary and foreseeable consequence is that that person's rights under the Covenant will be violated in another jurisdiction, the State Party itself may be in violation of the Covenant. This follows from the fact that a State Party's duty under Article 2 of the Covenant would be negated by the handing over a person to another State (whether a State Party to the Covenant or not) where treatment contrary to the Covenant is certain or is the very purpose of the handing over." 104 The list of fundamental rights whose potential violation precludes rendition includes at least the right not to be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman Although this line of jurisprudence could be seen as an extensive interpretation of the concept of jurisdiction, the better view is that the recognition of the responsibility of the State involved in such cases is based simply on the recognition of a causal link between an act carried out by the State with respect to an individual within its jurisdiction and potential violation of that individual's fundamental rights committed by third States.
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This principle applies to every case in which an individual subject to the jurisdiction of the State (whether or not within its territory) is transferred from its jurisdiction. The formal characterization of the act through which the individual is actually transferred to the jurisdiction of another State is without relevance for the applicability of the principle of non-refoulement, as that principle applies equally to extradition, deportation, expulsion of illegal immigrants 114 and irregular renditions. Furthermore, the principle of non-refoulement applies to every person, whatever his or her past crimes or the danger he or she is perceived to pose to the State in the custody of which he or she is held.
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It should also be emphasized that the prohibition of refoulement not only prohibits States to surrender individuals under their jurisdiction to States where there is a substantial risk that they will be subjected to violations of their fundamental rights, but also prohibits their surrender to countries which are likely, in turn, to surrender them to States where their fundamental rights may be breached. 116 Lastly, a State cannot avoid its human rights obligations when transferring individuals who are in its custody to another State, even if they are not and never have been held on its national territory. If the relevant test of "jurisdiction" for the purposes of human rights law is whether or not the individuals are "under the authority and control" of the detaining party, the principle logically applies also to the transfer of detainees from the custody of the Coalition forces to the local authorities in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is not to the point to argue, as the United Kingdom has done before the Committee against Torture, that the principle of non-refoulement in Article 3 of the CAT is not applicable to the transfer of suspects into the physical custody of the Iraqi or Afghan authorities "because the individuals in question are subject to the jurisdiction of either Iraq or Afghanistan throughout. There is therefore no question of extradition or expulsion."
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As much is confirmed by the response of the Committee, which, having affirmed that "the Convention protections extend to all territories under the jurisdiction of a State Party and (…) this principle includes all areas under the de facto effective control of the State Party's authorities," 118 rejected the United Kingdom's argument, recommending that it "should apply articles 2 and/or 3, as appropriate, to transfers of a detainee within a State Party's custody to the custody whether de facto or de jure of any other State." This brief analysis has set out the principles governing the applicability of the two bodies of law which provide protection for individuals detained during the "war on terror". It demonstrates that no matter where they are held, they are always entitled to some measure of protection under international human rights law and, depending on the context in which they were captured, also under IHL. A number of recent decisions, both international and, more importantly, domestic, indicate an incipient reaffirmation of the orthodox understanding of the applicability of the rules of IHL and international human rights law.
With regard to the status of individuals captured in Afghanistan, the distinction that the US seeks to draw between the "war" against the Taliban and that against al Qaeda has recently been firmly rejected by a judge of the District Court for the District of Columbia. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 120 Judge Robertson held that:
"The government's attempt to separate the Taliban from al Qaeda for Geneva Convention purposes finds no support in the structure of the Conventions themselves, which are triggered by the place of the conflict, and not by what particular faction a fighter is associated with."
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The judge further held that detainees could only be denied POW status and treatment following a determination by a competent tribunal, and that the presidential determination and the "combatant status review tribunals" were not sufficient for these purposes. 122 As a result, it was held that the trial of the Although the position of the US that detainees at Guantánamo Bay are not subject to US domestic legal protections was initially approved by some US courts and disapproved by others, 129 in June 2004 the Supreme Court in Rasul v. Bush held that US courts had jurisdiction to hear claims for habeas corpus in relation to prisoners at Guantánamo Bay, by virtue of the mere fact that they were being held by the State. 130 The holding of the Supreme Court, although based solely on considerations of domestic law, parallels the finding of the InterAmerican Commission (again in the Precautionary Measures decision) that as a matter of international law, for the purposes of applicability of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, individuals held at Guantánamo Bay were under the "authority and control" of the US. 131 Finally, in Abu Ali v. Ashcroft 132 a US court has taken a huge step towards holding the executive accountable in relation to the detention of persons abroad by third States on behalf of the US. The judge ruled that, in principle, the US courts have jurisdiction to entertain a petition for habeas corpus by an individual detained by a foreign government where there is prima facie unrebutted evidence that he is in the "constructive custody" of the US, in that, inter alia, agencies of the US had "initiated" his arrest abroad, US officials had been involved throughout his detention and in his interrogation abroad, and the foreign State would release the individual into the custody of US officials if so requested. 133 In rejecting the argument of the executive that habeas corpus was not available on the sole basis that the individual was detained by a foreign State, the judge observed:
"The full contours of the position would permit the United States, at its discretion and without judicial review, to arrest a citizen of the United States and transfer her to the custody of allies overseas in order to avoid constitutional scrutiny; to arrest a citizen of the United States through the intermediary of a foreign ally and ask the ally to hold the citizen at a foreign location indefinitely at the direction of the United States; or even to deliver American citizens to foreign governments through the use of torture (…). This Court simply cannot agree that under our constitutional system of government the executive retains such power free from judicial scrutiny when the fundamental rights of citizens have allegedly been violated." 134 
